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“Aerial warfare” is the term used to describe the use of military aircraft 
and other flying machines in warfare. This includes a wide range of air-
craft, helicopters, missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles designed to 
establish control of airspace, attack targets, maintain air mobility and 
conduct intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance (NATO, 
2016). Because of its unique attributes, air power has become the pre-
ferred instrument for politicians and commanders to achieve strategic 
and operational objectives across a spectrum of conflicts, ranging from 
humanitarian aid to combat action. Consequently, the Royal Norwegian 
Air Force (RNOAF) has deployed air assets to a wide range of operations 
in Europe, Asia and Africa during the last two decades. Most recently, 
RNOAF deployed F-16 combat aircraft to operation Odyssey Dawn (OD) 
and Unified Protector (UP) in Libya (2011), and C-130 transport aircraft 
to operation MINUSMA in Mali (2016, still ongoing). 
Air campaigns like OD/UP and MINUSMA are conducted through a 
series of parallel and sequential Composite Air Operations (COMAO). 
COMAO is the term used when dissimilar types of aircraft interact in 
coordinated actions, to achieve defined military objectives within a 
given time and geographical area. It normally involves between 20–100 
aircraft. In order to achieve effect through interaction in COMAO, a key 
leadership principle is centralized control and decentralized execution 
(NATO, 2016). Centralized control places the responsibility and author-
ity for planning, directing and coordinating air capabilities with a single 
commander and his staff. The centralized authority is usually located 
at a Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC). Decentralized execu-
tion involves delegating execution authority to sub-commanders, to 
make on-scene decisions that exploit opportunities in complex, rapidly- 
changing or fluid situations. The latter leadership role is referred to as 
the Mission Commander (MC). The MC is given the task through an 
Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO describes essential task informa-
tion for the COMAO, such as objectives, participating forces, target, 
time frame, Rules of Engagement and deconfliction parameters. Even 
though the ATO contains a lot of information, it serves only as a broad 
set of parameters for the COMAO. Through planning and coordination 
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with all participating forces, the MC must develop an air operation plan 
that enhances interaction, ensures effectiveness, as well as minimizing 
threats to the COMAO. 
Being the MC is thus an extraordinary leadership challenge. The role 
involves having overall responsibility for the COMAO, in combination 
with solving specific tasks as a flying crew member within the COMAO. 
Key leadership qualities needed to succeed are the ability to (Fredriksen, 
2012):
• Create effective interaction with professionals within and across 
organizational boundaries.
• Create and maintain interaction with co-located and geographically- 
distributed forces.
• Maintain high situational awareness (SA) in dynamic and rapidly- 
changing situations. 
• Make sound decisions under time pressure, with limited informa-
tion and means of communication.
• Cope with stress.
This chapter explores the leadership practices of Mission Commanders, 
with the aim of discussing key features in their leadership practices that 
contribute to effective interaction in the execution of COMAO operations 
and handling of unexpected events. 
Theoretical framework
In this chapter, High Reliability Organizations (HRO) is the chosen the-
oretical framework, since it fits the description and the development of 
operations and risk management in the RNOAF. HRO is a theoretical 
perspective that describes organizations with high complexity, that expe-
rience extraordinarily few accidents despite the assumption that com-
plex organizations cannot avoid accidents in the long run (La Porte & 
Consolini, 1991; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). HRO is often portrayed as an 
opposing view to Normal Accident Theory (NAT) (Perrow, 1984). RNOAF 
acquired the F-16 as their primary fighter aircraft in 1980. In the period 
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between 1980–1989, 14 serious accidents, killing six pilots, were recorded. 
This drew attention to the need for safety and risk management in the 
organization, and the subsequent measures led to a significant drop in 
accidents. The latest accident resulting in the loss of an F-16 aircraft was 
recorded in 2001. Since the year 2000, the F-16 fleet has been continuously 
updated with new technology. The operational demand has expanded to 
involve more complex operations, and a shift in Norwegian defense poli-
cies has brought the F-16 community to combat action. 
In the context of organizational structure, a COMAO can be 
described as a multi-team system (MTS). An MTS is defined as two or 
more teams that interact directly and interdependently in response to 
environmental contingencies, towards the accomplishment of collec-
tive goals (Zaccaro, Marks & DeChurch, 2012). While pursuing differ-
ent proximal goals, all teams share at least one common distal goal; in 
doing so, they exhibit input, process and outcome interdependence with 
at least one other team in the system (Mathieu et al., 2001 in Zaccaro, 
Marks & DeChurch, 2012). Figure 26.1 depicts a typical COMAO organ-
ization, where the team level represents the smallest fighting unit in the 
COMAO. A fighting team in air combat is called a formation, and nor-






















4 GR4 GAF, 8 F-16 RNOAF,
4 F-16 DAF, 4 F-35 RNOAF,











Figure 26.1 An example of the organizational structure of a COMAO.
Multi-team systems are usually formed to deal with highly turbulent 
environments. They consist of teams from different organizations that 
may have very different core missions, expertise, norms and operating 
procedures. Yet, they need to create effective interaction quickly to solve 
a common task that can withstand critical situations and unexpected 
interaction in  aerial  warfare
485
events. In accordance with DeChurch et al., (2001) “..they represent 
a point on the organizational environment continuum precisely where 
leaders are most needed” (DeChurch et al., 2001, in Zaccaro et al., 2012). 
Despite its importance, there is little research on the topic of leadership 
in MTS. 
Research methods
Exploring the leadership practices of MCs, this study takes a pragmatic 
approach (Creswell, 2009). A pragmatic approach allows for a greater 
freedom of choice with regards to methods, techniques and procedures 
for collecting data about the research problem. Data has been col-
lected through observation of COMAO execution, interviewing MCs 
and pilots to better understand the leadership required to maintain 
effective interaction and decision-making in the event of dealing with 
unexpected situations. The leadership practices that will be described 
are practices that work within the social and historical context of the 
RNOAF and NATO. They may not apply directly to other professions 
or organization cultures, but might inspire critical reflection on general 
leadership practices regarding interaction and handling of unexpected 
events. 
Creating effective interaction in COMAO
Creating effective interaction and handling unexpected events suc-
cessfully, is the product of many factors. The aim of this chapter is not 
to explain all of them, but to explore how MCs contribute in making 
COMAO relatively safe in aerial warfare. In accordance with HRT, the 
assumption is that they are doing something that others can learn from. 
They are assumed to be good at it. Observing the field of study, three dis-
tinct factors were discovered that enhance interaction in COMAO: a joint 
practice of COMAO, a joint process for learning, and leadership. Each 
factor will be explored in detail. Leadership characteristics are described 











Figure 26.2 Factors developing effective interaction and handling of unexpected events in COMAO.
Joint practice
“(OD/UF Libya) Due to technical problems, we were unable to contact the other 
participants in the COMAO prior to flight. We only received a coordination card 
from the Combined Air Operation Center and executed the mission. It all worked 
out very well since we had practiced COMAO training with the same nations in 
different exercises previously.”
F-16 pilot, RNOAF 
Developing effective interaction in training between formations from 
different armies and nationalities is the key to success in warfare. In 
the pilot community, this is referred to as establishing mutual support. 
Since WWII, it has been a well-established practice that mutual sup-
port between aircraft is a force multiplier: A formation of two fight-
ers outperform two fighters employed singularly. Even though today’s 
fourth and fifth generation multi-role aircraft are less specialized than 
their WWII ancestors, they still operate under the same principle of 
mutual support. For example, an F-16 has a combat endurance of 1.5 
hours, but when it is supported by an air-refueling aircraft, its endur-
ance increases to human factor limits (approximately 6–8 hours). Inter-
action in COMAO is a matter of establishing mutual support across 
organizational boundaries. 
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Interaction – a skill that can be mastered
Scholars present different definitions and perspectives on the essence 
of interaction (Eggen & Nyrønning, 1999; Torgersen & Steiro, 2009). In 
the practice of aerial COMAO, effective interaction that sustains the 
demands and threats in a war campaign is viewed as a skill that can 
be mastered through practice. If NATO practices COMAO in peace-
time, they will gain experience and knowledge that will also work in 
war. In other words, interaction and the mastering of unexpected events 
are controllable factors if you follow certain principles in training. One 
principle is to train as you fight. This implies that the training must be in 
accordance with what you will actually do in combat. This, which might 
be viewed as an obvious lesson today, can be traced back to the US com-
bat experience in Vietnam. Prior to the Vietnam War, the US Air Force 
experienced many restrictions in training. Air crew were not properly 
prepared for the threats they faced in the war, which resulted in heavy 
casualties. In order to mitigate these lessons, Exercise RED FLAG was 
initiated to better prepare aircrew for combat. For the first time, USAF 
airmen started to train systematically during peacetime, employing 
COMAO (Norwood, 1994). RED FLAG provided realistic training in a 
combined air, ground, space and electronic threat environment, and cre-
ated a learning environment where ideas could be exchanged between 
participants. Due to its success, RED FLAG is today one of many exer-
cises where NATO aircrew interact in COMAO training. The sole pur-
pose is to reach a level of proficiency that will sustain the demands of 
modern aerial warfare. 
A second important principle of COMAO training is that it needs to 
be conducted with a progression in challenge. Since NATO is the domi-
nating air power in the world, both in terms of numbers and technology, 
a pitfall in the training is that a realistic opponent in an exercise scenario 
is an inferior opponent. In other words, you risk facing an opponent who 
does not challenge your abilities. For that reason, COMAO exercises, 
which usually last for ten days, are designed with a progression in chal-
lenge. They generally start out with realistic best-case and expected sce-
narios based on likely war scenarios in the world today, and progress to 
worst-case scenarios and occurrences of unexpected events. In this way, 
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aircrews are exposed to different interaction problems in controlled sce-
narios and can learn from different situations.
A third principle is that all participants must be willing to expose 
their own mistakes to give others a chance to learn from them. As they 
say, people learn from their own mistakes, but smart people learn from 
others’ mistakes. Hence, joint exercises provide NATO forces with a 
unique opportunity for collective learning, that can be described as a 
community of practice, according to Lave & Wenger (1991). Joint prac-
ticing of the operational skills required for effective interaction in 
combat leads to a development of standardized concepts of operation, 
tactics and standard operating procedures (SOP). In most COMAO 
exercises, participants come together at a common air base. They meet 
face-to-face for planning and learning processes, and interact in social 
programs in the evening. All these activities facilitate the develop-
ment of trust and knowledge about differences in norms and culture 
(Hislop, 2009:165–175). 
Norwegian fighter pilots who served in Libya found that COMAO exer-
cises serve their purposes in war (Fredriksen, 2012). The way COMAO is 
conducted in war does not change from how it is practiced in training. 
Knowing the structures of interaction in advance creates a greater oppor-
tunity to be successful from day one in a war. It also reduces pilot stress 
and increases pilots’ work capacity, so that they are able to cope with the 
unique challenges that only occur in war. 
Joint process for learning
Every COMAO follows a standardized working process of four phases led 
by the MC: a planning phase, a briefing phase, a performance phase and 
a debriefing phase. The cycle lasts about twelve hours: four hours plan-
ning, two hours briefing, four hours performing, and two hours debrief-
ing. This process is embedded in the practice, and is comparable to the 
Experimental Learning Model (ELM) (Kolb, 1984), where the planning, 
briefing and performing phases can be viewed as the concrete experience, 
the debriefing phase as reflective observation and abstract conceptualiza-
tion, and the following day COMAO as active experimentation. 
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This process is not only embedded in the conduct of the overall 
COMAO. It is present on all sub-levels in the COMAO hierarchical struc-
ture. Parallel to contributing to the COMAO learning process, all air 
crews need to participate in the learning process on the sub-commanding 




Figure 26.3 COMAO learning process.
Planning
“The planning phase is the most challenging process to lead. First of all, you 
need to come up with a good plan. Then you have to make sure that everybody 
shares a common understanding of the plan. If not, there will be misunder-
standings and chaos.”
MC, RNOAF
The planning process serves two main purposes: (1) To create a plan that 
will solve a specific task and meet established safety requirements, and (2) 
create a collective situational awareness (SA). The former is similar to a 
rational analytic decision-making process. The MC normally uses a check-
list that guides him/her through the most important steps and issues that 
need to be solved. There are established common MC checklists, but many 
MCs prefer personal guides that are tailored to their own experience and 
planning knowledge. Before the actual planning starts, the process begins 
with a brainstorming session that is often referred to as “the 4 Ts”:
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Table 26.1 The 4 Ts brainstorming structure in a COMAO planning process (based on the 
syllabus in the Tactical Leadership Program COMAO Course, https://www.tlp-info.org/home/
composite-air-operations).
COMAO Planning process: The 4 Ts
TASK Analyzing the task given in the ATO:
What is the commander’s intent? 
What are we supposed to achieve? 
What is a satisfactory end-state? 
What are the resources? 
What are the limitations?
TARGET What are the goals?
Which targets are to be attacked?
At what time?
What kind of damage level is required?
THREATS What may stop us from achieving the goal?
What can intelligence tell us about the enemy?
Weather, clouds, terrain, time of day? 
TACTICS Analyzing task, target and threats: What is a suitable plan for this COMAO?
After having decided upon an overall game plan, the actual planning 
phase progresses with detailed planning, coordination and decision 
making, that must be resolved before the COMAO can fly in a safe man-
ner. Representatives from all participating formations participate in the 
planning process. This practice has several advantages:
• The MC can monitor progress in the planning process and interact 
with sub-commanders in problem-solving immediately when needed.
• The MC can call for a status meeting (usually lasting only ten min-
utes) to get and give all participants an overall status of the process.
• All formations flying in the COMAO have one representative who 
has SA over the process and the overall plan for the COMAO, and 
who can relay information to planning processes that are happen-
ing at formation and individual level.
Together, this contributes to collective SA. About 20 % of the air crew fly-
ing in the COMAO are directly involved in the creation of the plan, and 
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know their own specific task and what role it plays in solving the overall 
objective of the COMAO. 
Contingency planning
A plan will always be the product of many assumptions. If the assump-
tions are incorrect, it may lead to the occurrence of unexpected events that 
can be dangerous or reduce the COMAO’s ability to achieve its objective. 
The MC needs to prepare for changes in the assumptions. In the planning 
process, this is called contingency planning. Contingency planning is a 
risk-assessment and risk-management process, often associated with mod-
els and processes like the Bow-tie Model (Torgersen, 2015:48–53) and Oper-
ational Risk Management (ORM)(OPNAVINST 3500.39B, 2004). The latter 
is incorporated as standard procedure for all safety work in the RNOAF 
(BFL 0101–1). Due to time pressure in the planning phase, a mental ORM 
is performed. This means that the ORM process is carried out verbally, as 
opposed to a more time-consuming written process. Subject to so many 
different types of hazards, this may seem inadequate. Since separate con-
tingency-planning processes are completed on all hierarchical levels in the 
COMAO organization, it actually covers a wide aspect of potential dangers. 
The contingency-planning process usually reflects changes in four 
assumptions: the enemy’s expected course of action, the environment, 
technical equipment and reduction in capabilities (aircraft that perform 
specific tasks). Changes in any of these factors are compared with what 
the ATO depicts as an Acceptable Risk Level (ARL) for the COMAO. The 
ARL is a guideline for how many people and aircraft the commander is 
willing to lose to achieve the goal of the mission. The MC uses deduction, 
by reflecting on scenarios that may be unique to this specific mission, 
and experience, when reflecting on different scenarios that are known to 
happen in COMAO. The result of this process ends up in a picture of 
changes that might lead to a cancellation of the entire COMAO (known 
as a NO GO criteria), and for changes in the assumption that will require 
adjustments to the main plan. A complete planning process will therefore 
result in a main plan, a set of NO GO criteria, and a number of alternative 
plans that will take effect when unexpected events occur. As a princi-
ple, all alternative plans are kept as close as possible to the main plan. 
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All planning information is written down on a coordination card that all 
participants receive in the MASS BRIEFING.
Leading the planning process, the MC needs to have enough experience 
and knowledge of all the capabilities in the COMAO to create an initial plan 
that makes use of all the resources at hand. The MC must be able to engage 
in fruitful discussions with sub-commanders and formation leaders, and 
make decisions that take into account individual needs without hampering 
effective interaction in the overall COMAO plan. Keeping oversight in the 
process, delegating and engaging in problem-solving are important qual-
ities. Working under time pressure, the MC needs to demand progress in 
the work, balancing communication to respect cultural diversity. 
Briefing
“What separates the excellent MCs from the others is their ability to convey the 
plan in the MASS BRIEFING in such a way that everybody understands the big 
picture and how their task is important in the plan.” 
MC, RNOAF
The briefing, or MASS BRIEFING as it is called in COMAO, may be con-
sidered the most important leadership process in creating a collective SA 
(Fredriksen & Moen, 2013:209–212). All participants in the COMAO attend 
the MASS BRIEFING, as it is considered to be too dangerous to have par-
ticipants flying who are not thoroughly familiar with the overall COMAO 
plan. The content of the brief is a repetition of the 4 Ts, that balances the 
level of details to what is relevant for all the participants. Details that are 
only relevant at the sub-commander or formation level are covered in a 
separate briefing held after the MASS BRIEF. At the end of the briefing, all 
participants should know what the plan is, why, what their individual task 
is in the main plan, as well as the different contingency plans.
The briefing process follows norms. It always starts punctually with a roll 
call of all formation members. The briefing is a one-way communication 
process lead by the MC, and it is supported by sub-commanders and other 
personnel who have been delegated responsibilities in the COMAO plan-
ning phase. In order to ensure efficiency, questions are always addressed 
at the end, and they are limited to clarifying or confirming information. 
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Either the plan is safe and sound or the COMAO must be cancelled. At this 
point in the process, there is no time to make big changes. 
The MASS BRIEFING tests the MC’s communication skills. The 
plan needs to be visualized for the participants. They must understand 
every time-critical interaction that happens in the COMAO, potentially- 
dangerous situations that can occur with non-compliance, and which 
events that could trigger changes in the plan.
Performing
“The MC needs to have enough brain bytes available to maintain SA on the 
COMAO, and not only the action that is going on within his own formation. I 
have seen many times that trigger events occur that should alter the main plan, 
but the MC for some reason doesn’t act on it.”
MC, RNOAF
In the performance phase, the COMAO plan is set out in reality. In aca-
demic terms, this is when the theory is tested. The main focus for the 
MC is to maintain high SA and to monitor the COMAO. A UHF radio 
is the means of communication between the different formations in the 
COMAO. Since radio communication is limited to one person speaking 
at a time, it is difficult for the MC to give instructions to the other ele-
ments during flight. It requires significant communication discipline and 
a solid communication plan that establishes how information is prior-
itized on the common UHF frequency. Adherence to the communication 
plan is the most important factor to maintain a high collective SA. 
If the assumptions in the plan are correct, the COMAO will be exe-
cuted in an orderly fashion with effective communication. The collective 
SA in the COMAO will be high, resulting in actions being performed 
without the need for further coordination and communication. This is 
referred to as implicit coordination (Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Converse, 
1993). When unexpected events happen (a trigger event), it is of utmost 
importance that this is recognized by the MC, and that he/she reacts to 
it in accordance with the contingency plan. If this is the case, an unex-
pected event may not create a problem for the COMAO. If not, a dan-
gerous situation might develop, either because formations are flying in 
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accordance with a plan that is not based on the right assumptions, or 
because formations are executing different plans. In both these cases, the 
collective SA is drastically reduced and actual communication increased, 
making it even harder for the MC to establish control and give instruc-
tions. Degraded SA often leads to formation prioritizing safety actions 
rather than executing the planned task.
The role of improvisation
Since the COMAO planning process covers a lot of contingencies, the 
occurrence of unexpected events that the MC is not prepared for are 
rare. During the interviews with RNOAF MCs, all had problems remem-
bering such events. This does not mean that the role of MC can be per-
formed with an absence of improvisation. A COMAO plan almost always 
requires small adjustments in the performance phase. These adjust-
ments, or improvisations, follow specific patterns. First of all, they are 
variations on the existing plan. The communication needed to initiate 
improvised actions cannot be open for discussion or vast amounts of 
information exchange, due to the means of communication. Hence, it is 
often transmitted as orders to be recognized and confirmed. The changes 
implemented in improvised actions are limited to as few as possible, and 
decision making is delegated to the most suitable level of authority in 
the hierarchical structure of the COMAO. This action limits the prob-
lem-solving process to the formations effected by it, and leaves it up to 
the specialists to make the right decision. Decisions made in the improv-
isation process are a balance between obtaining goals and maintaining 
safety, but safety will always predominate.
Debriefing
“The hard part is to identify the really important lessons that are valid for every-
body in the COMAO and communicate them clearly.” 
MC, RNOAF
The debriefing is an organized and structured reflection on action 
(Schön, 1983, 1987; Folland, 2012; Moldjord, 2016). The purpose of this 
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process is to create learning. As in all steps in the COMAO learning pro-
cess, the debriefing is conducted on all hierarchical levels in the COMAO 
organization. The MASS DEBRIEF focuses on the overall execution of 
the COMAO. The goal is to identify learning points that are relevant for 
all participants. The later formation debriefings will cover more specific 
learning points relevant for the formation or individual pilots. In total, 
the debriefing process will cover a spectrum of operational and tactical 
learning points, down to individual pilot switch-actions and maneuvers 
in specific situations.
The air crew uses two terms in the learning process: lessons identified 
and lessons learned. The goal of the debriefing is to identify important les-
sons that the participants can add to their knowledge for future COMAO 
operations. “Lessons identified” are not considered learned until the 
application of action has changed. As in most performance cultures, 
the debriefing is mainly concerned with what went wrong and correct-
ing these errors. The process seldom dwells on the positive aspects of the 
COMAO, mainly because they have a high-performance expectancy and 
limited time to cover all possible learning points in the debriefing. 
The debriefing process mainly addresses four questions (Fredriksen & 
Moen, 2013:215–217):
1. Were there any safety issues?
2. What happened?
3. What went wrong? Why?
4. How do we change it next time?
Safety is always paramount in COMAO exercises. What cannot be per-
formed safely in a training environment will become hazardous in the 
fog of war. In this part of the debriefing, anybody can address issues 
concerning any aspect of the COMAO. Bringing up safety issues in the 
beginning of the debriefing has two important functions: (1) Impor-
tant learning points are identified and can be corrected. (2) Real safety 
issues evoke emotions. If emotions such as fright and anger are not 




The re-construction of what happened is really the key to create valid 
learning. In a COMAO scenario where 100 aircraft are performing differ-
ent tasks in a dynamic air-combat scenario, nobody will have complete 
SA of what happens. While in war, aircraft are shot down and ground 
targets are destroyed, in a COMAO exercise, munition drops and mis-
sile firings are simulated in the aircraft. Even though these actions are 
assessed in real time in the air, they need to be validated on the ground 
after flight, to make sure the assessment was correct. Different tools, like 
a recorded radar picture, are used to reconstruct the COMAO execu-
tion and replay it chronologically for the participants in the debriefing. 
Munition drops and missile shots are called out at the correct time, with 
validation by the pilots performing the action. At the end of this run-
through, the MC and the COMAO participants have a picture of how 
the plan was actually executed in the air by the COMAO, which targets 
were destroyed, how many enemy aircraft were shot down and their own 
losses. This information is compared to the task and the overall objective 
of the mission, highlighting what could have been done differently to 
increase performance. 
Leadership trust
“In some cases, my confidence in the MC and the plan have been so low that 
the mindset leading my own formation has been to avoid collision with other 
formations and get us all safely back on the ground. These missions have no 
tactical value, except the learning of how not to do it.” 
MC, RNOAF
On all levels, in any organization, leadership is appraised as an important 
factor in task performance. However, in COMAO, leadership seems to 
be of the utmost importance to the overall task performance. The main 
reason for this is the constant time pressure that comes with the task. 
Time is often described as your worst enemy, especially in the planning 
phase, as the MC needs to keep pushing for results to meet deadlines 
given in the ATO. Trust is a factor that correlates with interaction and 
performance, especially in a high-risk and high-stress environment 
(Costa et al., 2001, Kramer, 1999; Rousseau et al., 1998). Temporary MTS, 
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like a COMAO, gives very little time to build trust. “Swift trust” build-
ing describes a condition where there is too little time to perceive deep 
relational trust (Meyerson et al., 1996). Expectations and stereotypes are 
imported from other settings, and play an important role in this process. 
The initial phase of working together in the COMAO is therefore crucial 
for establishing trust (Wildman et al., 2012). In the initial planning meet-
ing, the MC needs to give an impression of control over the situation. This 
is conveyed by demonstrating self-confidence, and by providing an initial 
idea of how the task and the process can be solved, as well as through the 
ability to delegate tasks. Further, the MC needs to be open minded to 
other solutions suggested by participants, challenge new ideas and only 
accept them if they contribute to a better plan for the overall COMAO. 
Language skills seem to play a vital role in establishing “swift trust”. The 
MC needs to be confident in speaking English. He or she should have a 
good grasp of the basic professional terms used by the different capabili-
ties in the COMAO, and understand typical problems that may degrade 
their performance. In the planning phase, the MC needs to keep the pres-
sure up in order to achieve results. Showing signs of hesitation will only 
cause frustration and reduced trust. Therefore, tasks are often delegated 
to nationalities and formations that have shown solid performance in the 
past. This type of MC knowledge is only gained through experience and 
participation in COMAO. Hence, the MC is always a very experienced 
and qualified pilot. 
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the leadership practices of Mission Command-
ers (MC) in Composite Air Operations (COMAO), giving insight into 
details in the practices that contribute to interaction and the handling of 
unexpected events, in an organization that can be described as an HRO 
and an MTS. The study indicates that joint practice and a joint process 
for learning and leadership play a vital role in the successful conduct of 
COMAO in war. Joint practice during exercises like RED FLAG provides 
the opportunity to develop the interaction skills that are needed in mod-
ern aerial warfare. Important principles in joint practice are that you train 
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as you fight, that you experience a progression in challenge and that all 
participants participate in the exchange of ideas and lessons learned. In 
developing interaction skills, COMAO exercises have a structured process 
for learning, consisting of four phases: planning, briefing, performing and 
debriefing. This learning process is present on all hierarchical levels in the 
COMAO organization. The handling of unexpected events is prepared for 
in the contingency-planning process. This process is similar to common 
risk-assessment processes. Actual unexpected events in the performance 
phase are handled through execution of alternative plans and improvisa-
tion. All actions are evaluated and corrected in the debriefing. The role of 
the MC is vital in all phases of the learning process. Leadership trust plays 
a significant role in the overall performance of the COMAO. The lack 
of trust may reduce task-oriented behavior and increase safety-oriented 
behavior in the performance phase. The development of “swift trust” 
is established in the planning phase. Self-confidence, language skills, 
an ability to create ideas and solve problems, make progress, and have 
knowledge of different capabilities and their special interests are impor-
tant characteristics in building “swift trust”. Therefore, the role of MC is 
given to very experienced pilots who are trained in COMAO operations. 
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